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A NEW LOOK AT THE INVASION
OF EASTERN MAINE, 1814

By
Barry J. Lohnes

During the last year of the War of 1812 the British launched an
invasion of the Maine District of Massachusetts, capturing a large
salient between the Penobscot River and the New Brunswick
border. Few historians have appraised adequately the inability of
the national and state governments to defend the region of eastern
New England, nor have they researched carefully the British
motivations behind the assault. Only through a closer look at the
defensive errors of the Americans is it possible to realize that the
British victory, though a tactical success, was a strategic failure.
The capture of Portland, Portsmouth, and points southward were
in the grasp of the British; it was one of the most costly mistakes of
the war to settle for so little.

From geographical and strategic standpoints Maine was very
dangerously located. The District was enveloped by British North
American provinces on two sides and its coastal area lay in the
shadow of the huge British naval base at Halifax. Even though the
District’s vulnerability had been established with a British invasion
of the Penobscot region during the Revolution, in 1812 most of the
seaports east of Boston were without defenses.
Problems regarding the defense of Maine became acute when
President Jefferson put the Embargo Act into effect in December
of 1807, in retaliation for the impressment of American seamen.
The Embargo, which forbade American merchant ships to
participate in foreign trade, caused economic stagnation in
Northern New England and prompted a revival of the Federalist
party in Massachusetts and the District of Maine.1 With the
Embargo, war with Great Britain became imminent, but it

appears that political patronage, rather than military expediency,
dictated the means for defending the region. Federal government
funds were spent for fortifications in the areas under Republican
control while the regions of Federalist domination were generally
neglected.2 To illustrate, three major rivers in Maine, the
Penobscot, the Androscoggin, and the Kennebec should have been
defended because they offered the only means of commercial
transportation in the District; the north-south flow of the rivers
tended to tie the agricultural, timber, and shipbuilding industries
to the Boston market. But only the Androscoggin and Kennebec
areas were defended. Both happened to be JeffersonianRepublican strongholds. In the Kennebec Valley Major General
Henry Dearborn had established a strong party machine while in
Lincoln County, at the confluence of the Kennebec and
Androscoggin rivers, William King had created a stronghold of
Jeffersonian Republicanism.3 In eastern Maine, where the
Federalists were in power, the region was left without even rudi
mentary defenses.4 Outside of a small redoubt at Eastport, the
38,000 citizens living between the Penobscot River and Passamaquoddy Bay were left without any type of land fortifications.5

Naval defense was non-existent east of Portland, and there were
no American blue-water warships east of the naval shipyard at
Portsmouth, New Hampshire. At Portland were stationed nine
Federal gunboats of an “utterly inferior” class, part of a gunboat
fleet constructed by the Jefferson Administration as a money
saving scheme.6 Ironically, the nine gunboats at Portland were
withdrawn shortly after the war began.7 Interestingly enough,
the commander of the Portland gunboat squadron prior to the War
of 1812 was Lieutenant Charles Morris, who was destined to play
a leading role in the American defeat in eastern Maine.8
When war was declared in 1812 after four years of economic
decline in the east, the people of Massachusetts and the District of
Maine demonstrated only lukewarm support for the war effort. In
some areas the defeatism had reached traitorous proportions.
Shortly after the outbreak of war, residents of Eastport, in the
prime smuggling area of Passamaquoddy, voted unanimously to
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preserve a “good understanding” with the New Brunswick people;
apparently their economic well-being was more important than
their patriotism.9

A clash between the Federal government and Massachusetts
occurred only four days after the declaration of war. The senior
General of the United States Army, Henry Dearborn, wrote to
Caleb Strong, Governor of Massachusetts, requesting that fortyone companies of militia be activated for the defense of the coast
east of Connecticut. Strong refused adamantly, complaining that
the request was in violation of the Act of 1795 which authorized the
Federal government to activate the state militia forces only in time
of national emergency.10 In retaliation to Strong’s recalcitrance, the
Federal government withdrew its regular detachments from
coastal garrisons in Massachusetts and Maine, leaving only one
regiment for the defense of the coast between Easport and Cape
Cod.11 Eventually Strong ordered three companies of Penobscot
militia to take up positions near the New Brunswick border to
alleviate the anxiety in that quarter. As it turned out, the motley
group of irregulars behaved so badly that the citizens sent them
home.12
The militia in Massachusetts and the District of Maine during the
War of 1812 numbered 3,000 men but the number was deceiving
because it was purely a paper organization, lacking arms, training,
and qualified officers. Only about 2,000 of the militia were
activated for short periods before the invasion of 1814.13
Frequently the men were ordered out to muster simply to get their
names on the roster; after this was done they went home.14 At a
court martial after the war it was found that some officers
recruited militia candidates and dismissed them after collecting
the bounty money.15 In regard to armament, one battalion of
Norridgewock militia reported only sixty-five men enrolled and
absolutely no artillery. Similar shortages were found throughout
the District.16 Indeed, the lack of state support for the militia
caused William King, commander of the 11th Division of Militia, to
comment that “no reliance can be placed on the militia, none
ought to be.”17
7

To worsen matters the Federal government hoped to embarrass
Massachusetts by letting the state fend for itself in defending the
land from the British. Government policy was summarized
adequately in a letter written by the Secretary of the Navy which
read in part: “If a people of a populous place with such powerful
means of defense . . . will not defend themselves, I see nothing
to prevent the [British] force from burning everything. . . .”18
Some of the political leaders in Maine realized that the District was
being sacrificed because of partisan interests, but they did not
know how to rectify the situation.19

What is more, the Maine people suffered from the dearth of
naval defense. Some of the more wealthy merchants were able to
absorb the business decline but the poorer classes had to struggle
for existence. Nova Scotian and New Brunswick privateers added
to the problem by harrassing coastal vessels left defenseless by the
paucity of United States naval protection. Joseph Leavitt, a barely
literate Bangor trader, described the situation:
For ten days back we have heard of a great number of coasters—belong
ing to this river [Penobscot]
, being taken by the privateers
Corn & all provisions very scarce & in short, none to be had;
people
are in a suffering state.
Fishing is now over & there have not been but
very few caught.20

Crop failures added to the problems of farmers transporting
their produce to the Boston market. Benjamin Robbins, who
farmed in the Winthrop area, noted that “many have been in want
of food and necessaries of life on account of the poor crops the
year last/’21 Niles’ Register described the residents of Maine as the
“starving inhabitants of the eastward.”22
The inability of the Maine residents to make a living left many in
a condition of apathy and dejection. As a result, more than a few
turned to smuggling. Besides the tons of goods exchanged in
Passamaquoddy Bay, there is evidence that a vigorous overland
trade existed between Fredericton, New Brunswick, and Bangor,
where a bountiful assortment of goods was transported in canoes
over a system of portages. Joseph Leavitt, the unlucky Bangor
8

trader, noted that the smuggling was controlled by customs
officials, whom he considered to be “custom house pimps” and a
“hungry set of wolves.”23

During the first two years of war the British welcomed the
produce that was smuggled into British North America and the
British Isles. Poor harvests in Great Britain and the Maritime
Provinces had forced the British to authorize the granting of
licenses to American merchants.24 But in the spring of 1814 the
situation changed drastically. With the defeat of Napoleon and
an increased food supply in Europe, Britain turnedits attentions to
the war in North America. An aggressive naval officer, Admiral
Alexander Cochrane, was sent to the American Station with strong
reinforcements of ships and seamen.25
Shortly after Cochrane took command, he extended the naval
blockade to include New England, which had been exempted
from the blockade because of the need for foodstuffs in Britain
and the Maritime Provinces. At this time there were no specific
targets selected for assault by the reinforced naval command. The
War Office and the Admiralty debated whether to attack the Navy
Yard at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, or Rhode Island. Cochrane
speculated on first destroying the seventy-four-gun ship under
construction at Portsmouth, then marching overland to join
General Prevost near Lake Champlain, thereby dismembering a
part of New England. Cochrane then considered the occupation of
Rhode Island and from there striking at points in southern New
England.26 Both of these plans had merit and if implemented,
would have forced New England out of the war and Britain would
have had an overpowering edge at the conference table.
Instead, the British adapted a strategy which was much less
decisive. Cochrane was to operate against Baltimore or Washing
ton while Prevost was ordered to advance into New York with
naval support from Lake Champlain, with the expectation of de
feating the Americans in a major battle.27 The third assault was to
take place in eastern Maine where the plans were to “occupy
. . . that part of the District of Maine which at present inter
cepts the communication between Halifax and Quebec.”28
9

The communications network in British North America
depended on the overland route between Quebec and Halifax
because the St. Lawrence River was frozen over from late Novem
ber to mid-April. General Prevost, the commander in chief in the
Canadian provinces, sent vital dispatches to Halifax and London
from Quebec during the winter months. Of equal importance
was the march of the 104th Regiment of Infantry along the portage
route to reinforce the endangered British army in Canada during
February of 1813.29 The value of the portage route was realized
again in December of 1813 when over 200 seamen were marched
overland to supplement the undermanned Royal Navy on the
Great Lakes.30
Actually, there was no military reason for occupying eastern
Maine to protect this route. The boundary in 1814 was ill-defined
and except for the passage through Madawaska, the route did not
touch the present-day boundary of Maine. Furthermore, the
nearest American troops were over two hundred miles distant.
Nevertheless, a historian of Madawaska has written that “marauaders, poachers, and skirmishers infested the forests of Temiscouata Lake,” causing the British to use armed guards to protect
the dispatch carriers.31 Apparently the British thought that the
renegades were American troops or militia, but there is no evi
dence to support this assumption.

From an economic standpoint, the merchants and officials of the
Maritime Provinces desired British occupation of eastern Maine
because American smugglers were gaining about 95 percent of the
carrying trade along the coast, thus depriving the Provinces of the
customs duties.32 Also, they believed that eastern Maine had been
shamefully ceded to the United States after the Revolution as a
gesture of appeasement at the conference table. Emotions ran so
high that both the New Brunswick Council and the Halifax
Committee of Trade petitioned the British government for the
occupation of eastern Maine; as it turned out, the petitions were
inportant in the government’s decision to invade the District of
Maine.33
On June 19, 1814, Admiral Cochrane received orders from the
10

Admiralty to dispatch an amphibious force to capture the island in
Passamaquoddy Bay. Subsequently, on July 11, the combined
force secured the surrender of Fort Sullivan at Eastport, without a
shot being fire. The British commander, Captain Thomas
Masterman Hardy, suggested to Admiral Cochrane that Eastport
would serve as an excellent base for ‘"further annoyance of the
enemy.”43 In the meantime Cochrane had decided that sterner
measures were necessary in order to bring the war to a close; he
ordered his commanders to “destroy and lay waste” all gov
ernment stores and merchant shipping and to “threaten private
property.”35

Little had been accomplished regarding the defense of the
District, although sporadic raids had occurred along the coast
prior to the capture of Eastport.36 Two days before the capture of
Eastport, the Adjutant General of Massachusetts had somehow
deduced that the Penobscot region was about to be attacked in
force. In spite of his apprehension, he ordered only one brigade to
be put in readiness to muster “in consequence that the enemies
[sic] cruisers threaten to attack Castine and other towns in its
neighborhood.”37 But by the time the order was received, Eastport
had fallen to the British.
Upon hearing that the Passamaquoddy Bay area had been
captured, Strong allowed General Dearborn to place 1,100 militia
under Federal command to serve at points along the coast for a
period of three months. Ironically, once activated, the militia were
marched off to Lake Champlain, giving credence to Strong’s
mistrust of Dearborn and the Secretry of War.38 Although there
were but few remaining Federal troops in Maine, Dearborn
appointed one of his political friends, Major General John
Chandler, as their commander. Chandler, who had been a hired
hand on Dearborn’s farm in Monmouth, may have been skilled in
elocution but he had few military successes to his credit.39 As
events would prove, Chandler had no authority to issue orders to
the militia in the District of Maine.40

Meanwhile, a large British force had been gathering at Halifax
for the invasion of additional Maine territory. Secretary Bathurst
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amended his previous order for conquest to include territory
“more calculated to feel the pressure of war. ”41 The commanders
of the expedition, Governor John Coape Sherbrooke of Nova
Scotia and Admiral Edward Griffith, were given ample flexibility
by Bathurst’s order. But the lack of more direction from the War
Secretary caused the British to make an onerous error in the
invasion plans; the commanders overestimated the defenses of
Maine and thus western Maine was saved from invasion. Griffith’s
summary of the strategy reveals the error:
The only part of the Coast that could be attacked with any prospect of suc
cess, is that which lies between the Penobscot River and Passamaquoddy
Bay; the ports southward and westward of the Penobscot River, being situat
ed in a populous country; and from all the information we have been able to
collect, the defenses are too formidable to be attacked with so small a
force
it has been deeded upon that the expedition should go against
Penobscot.
The troops amounting to two thousand five hundred.42

Accordingly, the British commanders settled for an objective with
no actual strategic value.
On August 26 an armada of sixteen ships left Halifax for the
invasion of American territory. The commanders first intended to
occupy Machias but a brig which had been sent out in advance
sighted the American corvette Adams which was heading toward
the mouth of the Penobscot. Subsequently, Sherbrooke made sail
for Castine with hopes of capturing a United States warship.
Upon arriving at Castine, the British found that the Adams had
sailed up the Penobscot. After dispersing the few American
soldiers who held an artillery position at Castine, the commanders
dispatched six hundred soldiers and marines in sloops and barges
to search for the Adams.43

The Adams, commanded by Captain Charles Morris, had
recently returned from an unsuccessful commerce raiding cruise in
European waters. While heading toward Portsmouth with a
scurvy-ridden crew, the Adams struck a ledge in Penobscot Bay,
making the ship unseaworthy. After disembarking the sick crew
members, Morris maneuvered the ship up the Penobscot, realizing
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he had been sighted by one of Griffith’s reconnaisance brigs. At
Hampden, twenty-seven miles north of Castine, Morris ordered
the Adams dismantled, so that the ship’s damage could be as
sessed. On September 1, Morris conferred with Brigadier General
John Blake of Brewer, commander of the First Brigade of 10th
Division, Massachusetts Militia, regarding the defense of Hamp
den. Though the local militia were summoned to Hampden, there
was little cooperation between Morris and Blake. Morris resented
having to arm the militia with muskets from the Adams, and Blake
displayed his arrogance by refusing to dig earthworks at the most
favorable position, between Hampden Academy and the
Penobscot.44 Furthermore, Morris refrained from assuming
command of the land defenses, perhaps because he scented a
disaster in the making.

In any case, Morris was the only man who could have saved the
situation at Hampden. For some reason he failed to demonstrate
the aggressive spirit that had highlighted his career. He made no
plans for the integration of his seasoned seamen and marines with
the raw militia to bolster their flagging morale. In short, he seemed
content to allow the untried militia to stand or fall on their own
merits, without taking into consideration the futility of the Adams'
defense if the militia line was broken.45
On the cold, foggy morning of September 3, 1814, over 550 of
Blake’s militia stood unprotected on a sloping bluff stretching
from the church across the Bangor Road to the banks of the
Penobscot, just behind the Academy. Three hundred yards north,
on a high bank of the river, fourteen cannon from the Adams had
been stationed to protect the corvette, which was in a careened
position a few feet below Crosby’s Wharf.46 The British force,
which had landed three miles south of Hampden the night before,
attacked by land and river; the soldiers and marines forced the
bluff while barges in the river kept out of cannon range and fired
Congreve rockets in the direction of the bluff. According to one
member of the militia, the Americans on the bluff “gave way and
fled in great disorder" before the British bayonet charge.47 One
regimental commander of the militia “withdrew himself from the
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shot behind a building” and then “fled from the scene of the
action.”48
When the militia line was broken, Morris found that his posi
tion was outflanked; his crew had to set fire to the Adams and flee
across the narrow Souadabscock River to save themselves.
Morris and his men then fled overland to the Kennebec Valley
and onward to Portsmouth.49
The skirmish was over in less than a half hour. The capture of the
Penobscot had cost the British one man killed, eight wounded, and
one missing. Blake’s losses were one killed, eleven wounded, and
about eighty captured on the field of battle. Losses to the crew of
the Adams were one marine killed and one seaman captured.50 The
British continued their advance to Bangor where they engaged in
plundering. Joseph Leavitt wrote that “scarcely was there a house
or store but that suffered more or less—many stripped of all.”51
The British withdrew from Bangor and Hampden on September 5,
after burning shipping and extracting bonds to the value of $42,000
from the citizens, to guarantee the delivery of ships to the British at
Castine. Eleven of the ships which were not burned were confis
cated by the British and taken to Castine.52
The occupation of eastern Maine was completed with the
capture of Machias a few days later. Sherbrooke and Griffith
returned to Halifax on September 18, taking half of the armed
forces personnel with them. In general, the invasion of eastern
Maine had been undertaken with an excellent command
relationship between the army and navy. But it was unfortunate
for the British that such a substantial force was not used to attack
deeper into New England.

The remainder of Maine, west of the Penobscot, was equally
defenseless. A discouraged Bangor resident named Joseph
Williamson described the potential of the British invasion force:
Nothing hinders their ascending your river [Kennebec] in the same manner,
completely conquering every town. After the)' have done this, they can with
equal ease conquer all of the District of Maine and New Hampshire, for the
enemy have [sic] troops and a navy for all these conquests.53
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W illiamson implied that the lethargy of the Maine people in
defending themselves contributed to the British success. Even
Governor Sherbrooke noted that the "more wealthy of the inhabi
tants are really desirous of changing their present form of govern
ment.”54

Confusion was the order of the day in western Maine and
Massachusetts. Rumors mushroomed into predictions that the
British had ordered 15,000 German mercenaries to subdue Cape
Cod and Cape Ann, with Boston as the eventual objective.55
Despite the anticipated danger, Governor Strong refused the
request of General Dearborn to mobilize the militia. He informed
Dearborn that the Massachusetts General Court had to be
consulted before funds could be spent on the activation of the
militia. Other than calling for a General Court Session for October
5 and ordering work done on Boston’s fortifications, he did
nothing.56

Even though Strong refused to call out the militia, many of the
units responded to mobilization orders from their regimental
commanders. According to one newspaper, nearly 5,000 militia
were gathered at Portland by September 12.57 From available
accounts, the militia were low in morale and poorly led. In August,
one regiment resisted an order to take up defensive positions in
Portland which had been manned previously by Federal troops.5S
Another crisis was precipitated by a brigade commander who
refused to activate his unit when ordered to do so by his superior
officer.59 The shortage of arms and ammunition was another
problem; a year earlier the Secretary of W ar had cancelled the
scheduled weapons shipments to the Massachusetts militia.60 The
disorder was duly noted by W illiam Sumner, Strong’s special agent
during the emergency:
The accounts which Adjutant General Brooks received from the District
of Maine were so confused and contradictory, that he could not deduce from
them the true state of affairs in any threatened position, nor advise the
governor what means were to be adopted, or what number of troops should
be stationed in any such locality'.61
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Sumner was the only person able to create some semblance of
order in the District of Maine. Traveling up the coast from Boston,
Sumner organized 400 militia for the defense of the Portsmouth
Navy Yard. Noting that the York County militia were in utter
confusion, he proceeded to Portland, where he placed 1,100 militia
under Federal command at Fort Burroughs. At Wiscasset he was
helpful in settling a slight disagreement between Dearborn and
William King, the commander of the 11th Division of Militia. A
compromise was negotiated and King allowed two batallions of
militia to serve under Federal command, but only if they were
organized in militia fashion.62 Although Sumner was moderately
successful in calming some of the discord in the District, the
situation had deteriorated to such an extent that no single
individual could have solved the many-faceted problems
involving coastal defense.
By mid September requests began pouring in from townships to
send the militia home, resulting in a general deactivation later in
the month. At this time desertions exceeded enlistments. One
militia officer was so desperate for recruits that he enlisted
deserters from the British garrison at Castine, whom he considered
to be “good lively fellows.”63 By the first of October an adequate
defense of the coast was impossible if the British landed in force or
chose to bombard the seaports.

Not only were Governor Strong and other prominent Fedralists
disposed to allow the British occupation of eastern Maine, they
were ready to concede parts of the conquered salient to British
annexation.64 The Federalists were more concerned about
organizing the Hartford Convention in an effort to humiliate the
Federal government than they were about defending the District
of Maine from invasion.
The defenseless situation of Maine and the unwillingness of
Governor Strong to mobilize forces to recapture eastern Maine
caused bitter indignation among a large number of the District's
politicians. In mid-October a group of Republicans from Maine
asked the Massachusetts General Court to look into the potentiality
of driving the British out of Maine. The General Court neglected to
16

take action, much to the anger of the Republican faction in the
District. Naturally, this refusal of the General Court to look after
the interests of Maine caused many of the District’s people to feel
increasingly alienated from Massachusetts.65
The Federal government made the next move in considering an
expedition to force the British out of Maine territory. In
November, Acting Secretary of War James Monroe let it be known
that troops could be found by forcing the militia to serve under
Federal command. Though Monroe thought the expedition an
“object of greatest importance,” General Dearborn was
pessimistic. “Against regular troops, strongly posted,” Dearborn
wrote, “we cannot confide in the militia, unless their numbers are
very superior to that of the enemy. We remember the unfortunate
Penobscot expedition of the Revolution.”66
Nevertheless, William King, proposed commander of the
expedition, met with Governor Strong in late November to plan
for the campaign. Strong put a damper on the proposal and the
expedition never reached the advanced planning stage. Worse still,
the plan was leaked to a Boston newspaper and the British soon
learned of the scheme.67
The refusal of Strong to act on King’s behalf was a blessing in
that the proposed expedition had little chance for success. A year
earlier the contract system for supply had broken down in New
England, meaning that a large military force operating in Maine
could not have subsisted unless supplied by sea from areas of
agricultural surplus.68 Loss of command of the sea ruled out the
possibility of logistical support along the Atlantic sea lanes.
Moreover, William King had little actual military experience.

In the meantime, the British chose to consolidate rather than to
expand their conquests in eastern Maine. Having interpreted the
situation poorly from across the Atlantic, the British government
believed that the Americans had the strength to recapture eastern
Maine whenever they wished. Surprisingly unaware of the military
impotency of the Americans in New England, the British agreed to
return the conquered region at the conference table at Ghent,
17

where negotiations were in progress. Even the Duke of Wellington
thought the conquest “only temporary/' and Henry Gouldburn,
one of the British negotiators, believed that the Americans would
“fight hard” to get possession of the islands in Passamaquoddy
Bay.69Apparently neither the Duke nor Gouldbum knew that the
Americans had no naval and military forces to recapture the lost
territory.

Fortunately for New England, the British suffered setbacks at
Baltimore and Plattsburg. Failure to occupy important portions of
American territory, compounded with domestic difficulties and a
Russian threat from the east, caused Britain to compromise at the
conference table. After tedious negotiations, a status quo
antebellum peace was signed and eastern Maine was returned to
the United States.

The loss of eastern Maine during the War of 1812 is a sad chapter
in the State’s history. It is regretable that it was American military
and naval successes outside of the District which brought about the
restoration of eastern Maine rather than the people of
Massachusetts and the District of Maine who did next to nothing to
gain back the lost territory. On the other hand, British strategic
blunders spared the District of Maine from a much more
damaging invasion which could have encompassed all of Maine
had the British used the military and naval power at their disposal.
Furthermore, the Maine people came to realize that the union with
Massachusetts was impractical and undesirable, and the move
toward statehood began in earnest.
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A NEW LOOK AT THE INVASION OF EASTERN MAINE,

1814

A COMMENT

BY RONALD F. BANKS

I would like to begin my remarks by commending Barry for his
continuing fine work on this subject. His paper is well written and
meets the high standards he set earlier in his M.A. thesis. In
preparing for my assignment, I reviewed my own extensive
collection of notes on this subject. After doing so, I concluded that
Barry’s paper stands up well in respect to its factual content. There
are additional sources he might profitably check out before his
paper is published. But even so, I find his paper accurate in its
essential data.
I will therefore devote my comments to his main thesis, which is,
as I read it, that England made a strategic blunder in the summer
and fall of 1814, by not occupying more of Maine, indeed, more of
New England than it actually did. He contends that the military
unpreparedness of New England generally, and of Massachusetts,
and Maine in particular, made the area easy prey to British invasion
and occupation. Had England not over-estimated both the means
and will to resist of New Englanders, she could have occupied a
great deal more than eastern Maine and thereby knocked New
England out of the war. Moreover, she would have placed herself
in a much stronger position at Ghent to extract accession of eastern
Maine as part of the peace settlement. Failure to take full
advantage of her military superiority in this part of the country
was, Barry contends, a strategic error.
Comment on this thesis or any thesis for that matter has its
difficulties. One finds himself considering “iffy” questions which
involve one in what is now called counter-history. In such an
exercise, one is called upon to defend the historical validity of what
might have been. This can be a valuable exercise, but one must
always keep in mind that it is an essentially speculative exericse.
Nevertheless, in respect to Barry’s thesis, I offer the following
observations:
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First, I will concede that the British could have taken some
additional territory with relative ease, but probably not beyond
the Kennebec River. They could have bombarded Portland,
Portsmouth, and Boston, but had they tried to invade the territory
west and south of the Kennebec, I believe they would have faced
much stiffer resistance than they did in eastern Maine, and that
ultimately they would have failed to achieve an occupation. I say
this because south of the Kennebec River the population was much
larger with far greater resources at hand than in eastern Maine.
There were, also, far greater numbers who would have fought to
preserve their independence. The forces the British assembled to
occupy eastern Maine were small in number—at most 2,500 as I
recall—and many of them were mercenaries, certainly not a force
large enough to conquer areas where strenuous resistance could be
expected. After all, in August and September 1814, in excess of
5,000 militia were mobilized to guard the Maine coast west of the
Kennebec River, and in October 1814, the Massachusetts General
Court made available $1,000,000 to provide for further defense of
the Massachusetts coastline. Despite the opposition to the war in
Massachusetts, the people drew the line well before the thought of
permitting a British occupation without fierce resistance.

Even so, to have successfully occupied much more of New
England than they did would have required a greatly augmented
force. Such additions would have had to come from manpower in
both the Chesapeake Bay and upper New York theatres of the war,
thus jeopardizing their campaigns in those areas, campaigns
which, were they successful, would have resulted in far more
important strategic results than would have occurred had a greater
part of New England fallen to occupation.
Second, if an important object of occupying a larger portion of
Maine and points south was to take New England out of the war,
then the strategy should have been the one Cochrane
recommended: i.e., to cut New England and northern New York
off from the middle and southern states. Certainly, the risks of
adopting a strategy of occupation to achieve this objective far
outweighed the advantages to be gained. For, in reality, New
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England had never been in the war. She had followed three years
of denying the Madison administration both her manpower and
treasure, and it is clear she meant to persist in this stance.
Therefore, the best strategy toward her was one of salutary
neglect. As one Mainer put it to General Sherbrooke, “New
England can be conquered by kindness.”

In addition, to have advanced beyond the Penobscot or perhaps
the Kennebec in 1814 would have produced a change in the
attitude of New Englanders. As I suggested earlier, they may have
hated the war, but they hated the thought of an occupation even
more. They were willing to withhold their men and treasure from
the cause as long as the war did not impose great hardships on
them, but they would have fought to defend their homes and their
families from an occupation.

My point is that England might have been able to occupy more
territory, but in so doing it is difficult to see how her strategic
position would have been improved. Indeed, I should think it
would have been worsened considerably by producing quite a
different military situation in New England than had developed
otherwise.

Third, you may ask, why do I feel so strongly that Mainers and
others in New England would have put up such a resistance. They
seemed indifferent to the fate of eastern Maine. How do we know
that they would have reacted differently to a greater British
occupation? I have given some reasons which I believe are valid,
but you must also remember that eastern Maine was unique, in that
from the earlier days of our history it was a disputed territory. In
1783 the British only reluctantly surrendered sovereignty over it,
much to the consternation of New Brunswickians. Besides, Barry is
correct when he says it was an area difficult to defend due to its
closeness to Canada and nearly impossible to recapture due to
British superiority on the water. In was not only Governor Strong
who felt the proposed expeditionary force to drive the Briths from
Castine was folly, but Henry Dearborn himself. The same could
not be said for the rest of Maine south of the Kennebec, or of New
England generally.
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Finally, I think Barry and I differ on the conclusion that the
occupation of eastern Maine made sense to the British. I believe
what they took was about all they could have taken without
creating additional serious problems for themselves. He believes
they should have taken much more to strengthen their hand at
Ghent. Obviously, I feel that a more ambitious strategy of
occupation would not have changed the outcome at Ghent.
England’s decision to accept the status quo ante bellum had to do
with problems she was encountering at home and on the continent
in addition to her inability to control the Great Lakes here in
America. A bolder strategy in New England would not have
changed this larger reality.
And, of course, the overriding reality was that with the defeat of
Napoleon any compelling reasons for further conflict were lifted.
A continuation of the war, in the hope of such marginal gains as
would be represented in a possible cession of eastern Maine,
would have bordered on the chimerical if not the irrational.

Ronald F. Banks is associate professor of history at the University of
Maine, Orono. He is chairman of the Maine State Bicentennial
Commission. Dr. Banks is author of “Maine Becomes a State: the
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“Maine During the Federal and Jeffersonian Period: a Bibliographical
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Massachusetts during the War of 1812.
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